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THE TOBACCO LITIGATION:
A TENTATIVE ASSESSMENT
Robert L. Rabin*
INTRODUCTION
For forty years, beginning in the early 1950s, smokers suffering from
lung cancer sued tobacco companies for the harm they suffered with
hardly a notice in the world of public affairs.' This surely did not re-
flect widespread ignorance of the public health risks posed by tobacco.
On the contrary, by. the early 1990s, the vast majority of adults in this
country were well aware of the association between smoking and lung
cancer, reflected in part by the steady decline in per capita smoking
over the same time period.2
But then, the tobacco industry's fortunes-at least in avoiding ad-
verse publicity-shifted dramatically. The shift occurred as plaintiffs'
lawyers filed class action tort suits and collaborated with attorneys
general in pursuing state reimbursement claims for Medicaid and
other health care expenditures. 3 This activity on the litigation front
soon led to a long-term obligation of $240 billion by the industry, in
1998, to settle the state reimbursement cases, and continues to bedevil
the tobacco companies in the tort system, where massive punitive
damage awards hover like a storm cloud over the industry.4 There is
* A. Calder Mackay Professor of Law, Stanford Law School. Many thanks to Steve
Sugarman for helpful suggestions and Bernadette Meyler for excellent research assistance. A
more detailed discussion of the developments and analysis addressed in Parts II and III of this
comment can be found in Robert L. Rabin, The Third Wave of Tobacco Tort Litigation, in REGU-
LATING TOBACCO, Ch. 7 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 2001).
1. On the first two waves of tobacco tort litigation, 1954-65 and 1983-92, see Robert L. Rabin,
Institutional and Historical Perspectives on Tobacco Tort Litigation, in SMOKING POLICY: LAW,
POLITICS, AND CULTURE 110 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 1993), discussing
the singular lack of success by plaintiffs in that era.
2. In fact, by 1986, 92% of the public, including 85% of then-current smokers, believed that
smoking causes lung cancer. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, REDUCING
THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING: 25 YEARS OF PROGRESS, A REPORT TO THE SUR-
GEON GENERAL 190 (1989) (citing the 1986 D.H.H.S. Adult Use of Tobacco Survey).
3. The adverse publicity was not limited to the litigation forum. See PETER PRINGLE, COR-
NERED: BiG TOBACCO AT THE BAR OF JUSTICE 77-81 (1998).
4. On the state settlements, including the Master Settlement Agreement, see Milo Geyelin,
States Agree to $206 Billion Tobacco Deal, WALL ST. J., Nov. 23, 1998, at B13. On the continuing
threat of punitive damage awards, see infra text accompanying notes 19-25, 65-68.
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no final accounting in sight; indeed, even a blockbuster set of tort
awards that bankrupted the industry would not lead to tobacco van-
ishing from the scene. As long as a substantial number of adults con-
tinue to smoke-at present, about twenty-five percent nationwide 5-
it seems safe to say that cigarettes will be legally available. Hence,
some 430,000 premature deaths annually from smoking remain a
pressing public health concern, particularly in light of statistics indicat-
ing no downward trend in youth smoking.6
In view of these shifting and uncertain fortunes, it seems appropri-
ate, although hazardous, to take stock of what meaning can be as-
signed to the tobacco litigation almost a decade after it rose to such
public prominence. More specifically, I will offer some thoughts on
the impact of the litigation at this point, taking into account not just its
successes and failures, but also its place in the broader array of strate-
gies for reducing tobacco use. I will then offer some perspectives on
what the tobacco litigation has meant for other related ventures, such
as handgun and lead paint litigation, that similarly rely on tort-type
claims to promote public health and/or safety goals.
But even this broader assessment of impact would be incomplete if
it failed to take into account the potential secondary effects of the
tobacco litigation; in particular, how this litigation has served as an
educational medium and a means of generating fees that are in turn
used to bankroll other litigation-based social reform efforts. In the
course of my assessment, I will discuss these considerations that ex-
tend beyond the realm of precedent value. If, as things now stand,
tort law cannot be de-politicized, it can perhaps be de-mythologized
to some extent. This comment is an effort to that end.
II. LITIGATION ON FOUR FRONTS: A TENTATIVE ASSESSMENT
By now, the revelations of tobacco industry chicanery that surfaced
in 1993 are an oft-told tale that need not be recounted here.7 Suffice
it to say that a considerable number of sophisticated plaintiffs' attor-
neys who had previously shown no enthusiasm for involvement in to-
bacco litigation entered the fray with an especial eye to the prospects
5. NAT'L CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVEN-
TION, HEALTHY PEOPLE 2000 REVIEW 54 (1998-99).
6. NAT'L CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVEN-
TION, HEALTHY PEOPLE 2000 REVIEW 51 (1998-99). Compare NAT'L CENTER FOR HEALTH STA-
TISTICS, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, HEALTHY PEOPLE 2000 REVIEW 50
(1995-96)(stating that youth smoking was increasing) with NAT'L CENTER FOR HEALTH STATIS-
TICS, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, HEALTHY PEOPLE 2000 REVIEW, 51
(1998-99)(indicating that youth smoking may be leveling off).
7. See PRINGLE, supra note 3, at 138-59.
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of class action litigation against the industry. The opening salvo on
the tort front was Castano v. American Tobacco Co.,8 a nationwide
class action filed in the federal district court in Louisiana. In a novel
variation, a second front was opened in a Mississippi state forum with
the filing of a state claim for reimbursement of health care expendi-
tures on behalf of impecunious smokers.9 At roughly the same time,
the growing sensitivity to claims of harm from exposure to environ-
mental tobacco smoke triggered a class action alleging secondhand
smoke-related disease. 10 And finally, the long-standing claims of indi-
vidual smokers were revitalized."
As mentioned, none of these initiatives has come to closure. But
taking a vantage point somewhat removed from the field of battle,
what can be said about the consequences of these endeavors?
A. Class Action Tort Claims
Although the Castano class potentially represented upwards of
forty million claimants, the case was in a sense narrowly conceived.
Rather than resorting to the conventional claim for health-related
damages from smoking, the Castano lawyers made nicotine addiction
the centerpiece of their case. The class was framed to include smokers
medically diagnosed as addicted and those who had been medically
advised to quit but had not yet done so. This narrower characteriza-
tion of harm resulting from industry conduct linked nicely with the
developing evidence that tobacco executives engaged in a disingenu-
ous pattern of conduct in which they strove to conceal and misrepre-
sent information about the addictive properties of nicotine-indeed,
in which they appeared to manipulate the content of nicotine in to-
bacco products.
In denying the industry's effort to get the case dismissed, the trial
judge found the technical requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure dealing with class actions were satisfied.
In essence, the judge found that questions common to the class
predominated over individual questions, and that the class action was
a superior vehicle for litigating the questions. He reached these con-
clusions and certified the class as to two critical issues: 1) whether the
industry had engaged in a fraudulent course of conduct; and 2) if so,
whether punitive damages were warranted. With regard to more par-
ticularistic issues of individual reliance and a case-by-case need for
8. 160 F.R.D. 544 (E.D. La. 1995), rev'd, 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996).
9. See infra text accompanying notes 26-46.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 47-58.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 59-72.
2001]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
medical monitoring, the trial judge decided that it would be necessary
to resolve these claims at a later stage, perhaps through carving out
subclasses. By resorting to this bifurcated approach, the judge held
that foundational issues of industry responsibility could be tried in a
consolidated fashion.
In hindsight, the Fifth Circuit's refusal to uphold the class certifica-
tion may appear to have been inevitable.12 But a critical contempora-
neous decision by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals on the
propriety of class action treatment of mass tort cases almost certainly
sealed the fate of Castano on appeal. In Matter of Rhone-Poulenc
Rorer,13 Judge Richard Posner, writing for a panel of the appellate
court, decertified a class action brought by hemophiliacs suffering
from AIDS against blood solids manufacturers. 14 The plaintiff class
based their argument for liability on the defendants' alleged failure to
take reasonable care in guarding against the known risks of hepatitis
(care that would also have protected hemophiliacs from contracting
AIDS), and in failing to take adequate care with respect to donors.
Judge Posner reasoned that the claims were based on law that varied
from state to state, creating potentially significant difficulties in trying
the cases in consolidated fashion. 15 And, he added, certification
would unfairly require the industry, which had in fact won twelve of
the thirteen individual trials that had taken place, possibly to stake its
very existence on one roll of the dice. In his view, the requirement
would be premature because further individual trials might indicate
that mass certification was unnecessary. 16
These arguments clearly resonated with the appellate court in the
Castano case, which cited and quoted Matter of Rhone-Poulenc Rorer
repeatedly in its opinion. Publicly, at least, the Castano plaintiffs' at-
torneys took the choice of law concern to be the gist of the Fifth Cir-
cuit's decertification decision, and accordingly went on to file "son of
Castano" cases in a number of state courts, each of which would have
to apply only the law of its own jurisdiction.
A careful reading of the Castano opinion seems to belie this narrow
interpretation.' 7 In my view, the Castano court saw a considerable
number of knotty problems raised by consolidation-such as, the ar-
guably individual determinations of reliance, comparative fault, con-
12. See Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir.1996).
13. 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995).
14. Id.
15. Id. at 1300-01.
16. Id.
17. For discussion, see Susan Kearns, Decertification of Statewide Tobacco Class Actions, 74
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1336 (1999).
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sumer expectations, and actual damages-that would need to be
confronted at some stage, even if they could be disregarded in an ini-
tial phase of the trial. And most significantly of all, these issues poten-
tially would have to be faced for some forty million claims generated
by Castano itself. In sharp contrast, there were about one hundred or
so ongoing individual claims at the time Castano was decided-claims
that might wither away or remain at about the same quantitative level
if tobacco cases continued to be brought individually.
The aftermath of Castano largely bears out this reading. Virtually
all of the second-round Castano cases were either dismissed or lan-
guished in state courts, thus contradicting the notion that choice of
law was the essence of the tobacco consolidation concern. As of mid-
2001, class certification of post-Castano cases had been granted and
upheld only in the state of Louisiana, but denied or remained in doubt
in twenty-five other states.18
One notable outlier has been Engle v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,19
an initially little-noticed Florida state court class action, filed indepen-
dently of Castano (but roughly contemporaneously) by an attorney
team with no links to the Castano lawyers, who relied on the tradi-
tional disease-related basis for claiming injury instead of limiting their
sights to an addiction-based theory.20 In 1996, a Florida intermediate
court of appeals upheld the certification of a class of some 300,000-
700,000 Florida smokers suffering from tobacco-related diseases. 2'
When the Florida Supreme Court refused to hear an appeal by the
tobacco industry defendants, 22 the stage was set for a phase one trial
of the issues deemed suitable by the trial court judge for class disposi-
tion: whether the industry had engaged in deceptive conduct; whether
the epidemiological evidence established a causal link between smok-
ing and a variety of diseases from which members of the class suf-
fered; and whether punitive damages were warranted.2 3 After the
jury answered each of these questions in the affirmative, the same jury
engaged in subsequent phase two determinations in mid-1999. It
18. Bob Van Voris, What's Tobacco's Future in the Bush Era?, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 5, 2001, at Al.
19. Engle v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 94-8293 CA20 (S.D. FLA 2000), reh'g denied,
motion granted, Philip Morris, Inc v. Engle, 746 So. 2d 457 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999); writ of
error denied, R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Engle, 751 So. 2d 51 (Fla. 1999); subsequent appeal,
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Engle, 750 So. 2d 781 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
20. Myron Levin, Passive Aggressor; Litigation: Lawyer Stanley M. Rosenblatt's Small Firm
May Seem an Unlikely Adversary for Big Tobacco, But He's Confident He's Up to the Challenge
of His Life, L.A. TIMES, June 8, 1997, at Dl.
21. 672 So. 2d 39 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
22. Engle v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., rev denied, 682 So. 2d 1000 (FL 1996).
23. Richard Daynard, The Engle Verdicts and Tobacco Litigation, BRIT. MED. J., Aug. 5, 2000,
at 312.
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found that three class representative plaintiffs were entitled to $12.7
million in compensatory damages, and in mid-2000, it found that puni-
tive damages for the entire class were warranted in the astronomical
sum of $144.8 billion. 24 Subsequently, the trial court judge upheld the
award and, not surprisingly, the industry appealed.25
Whether the plaintiffs' victory in the Engle case will survive is
highly uncertain. Massive punitive damage awards are routinely cut
back on appeal, and this award also bears the strikingly unorthodox
feature of appearing to put the cart before the horse: Ordinarily, both
the size of a punitive damage award and its allocation would be based
on initial determinations of individual compensatory damage award
claims-a set of determinations in this case that will not be resolved
until claims by all members of the class have taken place (barring set-
tlement). More fundamentally, the sheer prospect of hundreds of
thousands of trials, or more realistically, the monumental task of sub-
classing batches of cases for efficient disposition in a fashion consis-
tent with due process, could lead the appellate courts to overturn the
Engle case altogether-although any such appellate intervention
would seem to have been likely before the mammoth and protracted
case proceeded this far. In sum, whether Engle will prove to have
staying power remains to be seen.
With the significant exception of Engle, the Castano returns-from
the traditional tort perspective of success at trial or favorable settle-
ment-appear to be modest at best at this point. If Castano itself
seemed doomed from the outset by inevitable appeal to a conserva-
tive Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, one may ask why a consortium of
high-powered plaintiffs' attorneys invested so much time and money
in the case. Although speculative, a real possibility is that the team
was in essence engaged in very high stakes poker. In other words,
gambling that certification at the trial court level, which did in fact
occur, would create sufficient unpredictability about a potentially cat-
astrophic loss to persuade the industry finally to consider the prospect
of settlement. Interestingly, this was precisely the course that un-
folded in the contemporaneous state health care litigation,
spearheaded initially by a rival group of plaintiffs' attorneys retained
by the states.
24. Michael Bradford, Punitive Tobacco Award Fought: Cigarette Makers Hit with Florida Rul-
ing, Bus. INs., Nov. 13, 2000, at 2.
25. Engle v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 122 F. Supp 1335 (S.D. Fla. 2000).
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B. The State Health Care Reimbursement Cases
The pioneering venture in the state health care reimbursement liti-
gation, the Mississippi case, was filed less than two months after Cas-
tano, in May 1994.26 In some ways, the two efforts to recover for
aggregated claims shared an affinity beyond near-simultaneous filing.
Both were undertaken by attorneys experienced in mass tort litigation
who were convinced that the unfolding revelations of the tobacco in-
dustry's indifference to public health concerns could be translated into
mass industry liability, as in asbestos litigation.27 But the health care
reimbursement claim, which would soon be replicated in one state af-
ter another across the nation, rested on a very different premise from
Castano. Although the reimbursement claim was based on precisely
the same tort-type conduct, the state's theory of recovery was, in fact,
not based on products liability law because the state was not a "di-
rect" victim suffering from a tobacco-related disease. Instead, Missis-
sippi and the states that were to follow its lead argued for relief on
equitable grounds such as unjust enrichment. 28
In essence, the states' legal theories, which later came to include
statutorily based claims, such as violation of consumer protection
laws, asserted that the industry's deceptive and misleading conduct
constituted a wrong against the public, as well as against individual
smokers. In arguing unjust enrichment, the claim was for restitution
of public tax funds that were allocated to treating impecunious smok-
ers whose health problems were allegedly the industry's responsibility.
A similar theory, wrongfully profiting at the expense of the public,
undergirded claims of conspiracy and consumer fraud, particularly
those targeted against industry tactics aimed at making smoking at-
tractive to underage youths.29
In reality, these theories were largely untested, and the claim that
the state's interest was independent of and distinct from the individual
smoker's generally rested on a shaky foundation.30 Untested or not,
26. PRINGLE, supra note 3, at 55.
27. See id. at 13-15.
28. See id. at 30-32.
29. For a detailed account of the strategy relied on in one key state, Minnesota, see Gary L.
Wilson and Jason A. Gillmer, Minnesota's Tobacco Case: Recovering Damages without Individ-
ual Proof of Reliance under Minnesota's Consumer Protection Statutes, 25 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 567 (1999).
30. Consider, for example, the claim of unjust enrichment. The industry was only "unjustly
enriched," presumably, if it profited from harm for which it should have been held legally re-
sponsible. But this sounds suspiciously circular. Industry responsibility presupposes smoker
non-responsibility, which is precisely the issue at the core of the individual cases. Similarly, a
public nuisance or conspiracy claim rests on the wrongful imposition of harm on the public -
where "wrongful" once again arguably raises individual issues of reliance and comparative re-
20011
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the theories of recovery multiplied to include deceptive advertising,
antitrust violations, federal Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organiza-
tions (RICO) claims, unfair competition, a variety of fraud allega-
tions, and in at least two states, Florida and Massachusetts, statutory
claims based on the enactment of specific health care cost recovery
legislation.3' The number of states bringing suit also multiplied. By
the summer 1997, the roster had grown to forty states. 32 Blue Cross
and labor union insurers were devising parallel lawsuits, and, in Cali-
fornia, cities and counties had joined in the fray. 33
Then, after months of rumors, in June 1997, the states and the major
tobacco companies reached a "global settlement"-in reality, a de-
tailed legislative proposal that was presented to Congress as an effort
to virtually extinguish the tobacco wars. The tobacco industry, which
for more than forty years had proudly proclaimed its invincibility from
product liability, was now prepared to underwrite the largest civil set-
tlement ever by paying $368.5 billion over twenty-five years to reach
closure on this front.34
Beyond doubt, the June 1997 agreement was a testament to the
awesome threat posed by the litigation strategy. What the industry
was willing to buy, at a very considerable price, was relief from litiga-
tion uncertainty. This latter point is underscored by the quid pro quo
concessions offered by the anti-tobacco forces in the proposal. Under
the plan, the state health care reimbursement suits would have been
sponsibility, even if the tobacco companies misrepresented health information. Moreover, in
purely economic terms, the claim for recovery of health care costs would seem to be interlocked
with the excise tax payments levied on the industry, if not - as some economists argued - the net
health cost savings to social welfare programs from premature deaths of smokers, as well. Com-
pare W. Kip Viscusi, A Post Mortem on the Cigarette Settlement, 29 CUMB. L. REV. 523 (1999)
with Gary T. Schwartz, Tobacco, Liability, and Viscusi, 29 CuMI. L. REV. 555 (1999).
31. PRINGLE, supra note 3, at 55 (noting that Florida and Massachusetts passed laws permit-
ting the state to recoup Medicaid costs from the tobacco industry); Bryce A. Jensen, From To-
bacco to Healthcare and Beyond - A Critique of Lawsuits Targeting Unpopular Industries, 86
CORNELL L. REV. 1332, 1346, 1358-61 (2001) (explaining the allegations of deceit and fraud
against tobacco companies and the basis for RICO claims); Ed Dawson, Legigation, 79 TEX. L.
REV. 1727, 1733 (2001) (referring to antitrust suits against the tobacco industry).
32. Doug Levy, Tobacco Turns Over New Leaf, Critics Say Proposed Deal Leaves Bad Taste in
Mouth, USA TODAY, June 23, 1997, at lB.
33. See Milo Geyelin, Second Wind: Is Big Tobacco Reeling? Maybe Not; It Wins New Round
in Court, WALL ST. J., June 5, 1998, at Al.
34. In addition, the proposed legislative package would have bound the industry to an array of
public health proposals, including acknowledgment of FDA jurisdiction to engage in constrained
regulation of nicotine; agreement to a "look back" provision under which the industry would
have been subject to fines linked to failure to reduce underage smoking according to targeted
goal and timelines; and bans on billboard advertising, use of human and cartoon figures in ads,
and brand-name sponsorship of sporting events and promotional merchandise. See Milo Geye-
lin, The Settlement: Terms of the Tobacco Pact, WALL ST. J., June 23, 1997, at B10.
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settled, and the industry would have been granted immunity from all
other forms of class action. Thus, in one fell swoop, the industry
would have eliminated its greatest nightmare-the prospect of cata-
strophic loss from a cluster of state recoupments, certified classes of
tort claimants, or third-party sources, such as Blue Cross or union
health plans, successfully convincing juries that the industry's past
course of conduct warranted potential multibillion dollar recoveries in
compensatory and punitive damages for the legions of injury victims
represented in the particular cases. Moreover, under another provi-
sion in the settlement plan, there would have been no punitive dam-
ages allowed in individual cases for industry conduct prior to the
enactment by Congress of the legislation. Once again, this provision
directly targeted a massive source of uncertainty-the prospect of a
breakthrough in individual cases with one jury after another reacting
with vehemence against the narrative of industry deceit. A third pro-
vision would have capped the total annual liability for awards on fu-
ture individual claims at five billion dollars, which is a considerable
sum, but nonetheless a fixed cap that would contribute from yet an-
other perspective to the predictability that the industry sought.35
There were other restrictions on litigation as well, but the point is
clear. The state health care cases may have rested on dubious theoret-
ical premises, but a realistic assessment of the threat presented by po-
tential catastrophic loss litigation requires more than just finely honed
theoretical analysis. By mid-1997, the industry faced the prospect of
being sued by virtually every state in the country, represented on a
retainer basis by a cadre of the most experienced and skilled tobacco
lawyers, pressing a variety of common law and statutory claims.
Other third-party claims lurked in the background. The documents
told a tale of industry deceit and indifference to public health consid-
erations. Could trial court judges in every, or virtually all, state health
care recovery cases be counted on to enter summary judgment, or
would the industry be at the mercy of juries exposed to the tale of
industry wrongdoing?
What the negotiating parties failed to recognize was that once their
"settlement" reached the halls of Congress, it would take on a life of
its own. Almost immediately, as the wave of anti-industry public sen-
timent crested, a far more draconian legislative proposal emerged.
The McCain bill,36 as amended, would have obligated the industry to
pay $516 billion over twenty-five years, and, even more strikingly, the
35. Excerpts from Agreement between States and Tobacco Industry, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 1997,
at B8.
36. S. 1415, 105th Cong. (1988).
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bill incorporated virtually all of the earlier-negotiated public health
provisions. Moreover as amended, the bill would have eliminated the
industry's hard-fought quid pro quo, which was the litigation immu-
nity provisions. Perhaps inevitably, a reversal of the legislative tide
occurred. It was bolstered by an urgent industry advertising blitz and
the backing of industry congressional supporters. In the end, no fed-
eral legislation was enacted.37
As the congressional battle waxed and waned, the industry-per-
haps as a strategy to promote a new image in timely fashion-settled
individually with the four states that were closest to trial, and that,
with one exception (Texas), perhaps presented the greatest threat of a
litigation setback: Mississippi, Florida, Texas, and Minnesota.38 In the
absence of these settlements, one might well have concluded, as the
congressional deliberations collapsed in June 1998, that the third wave
aggregation strategy had yielded precious little beyond massive addi-
tional documentation of industry wrongdoing.
But the four individual state settlements did amount to some forty
billion dollars, to be paid out over twenty-five years. And within a
year, in November 1998, the industry and the forty-six remaining
states had negotiated a $206 billion settlement of all outstanding state
health care reimbursement claims, which was considerably less in in-
dustry payout than the failed June 1997 agreement. On the other
hand, the new agreement contained none of the immunity provisions
from class action litigation and punitive damages included in that ear-
lier package. 39
In the end, it is difficult to assess the significance of the health care
reimbursement litigation. The so-called Master Settlement Agree-
ment, which extinguished any further liability of the industry to the
states, contained a scaled-back version of the public health provisions
in the earlier-negotiated 1997 agreement with some remaining restric-
tions on advertising and promotion aimed at the youth market: Bill-
board advertising was banned, and brand name sponsorship of
recreational activities was limited, among other things.40 But no
longer were there any provisions for industry "look back" penalties if
37. See Jeffrey Taylor, A New Call for National Tobacco Laws, Prompted by States' Deal,
Faces Hurdles, WALL ST. J., Nov. 17, 1998, at A4.
38. Noam Neusner, States OK Tobacco Deal, S.F. EXAMINER, Nov. 20, 1998, at Al.
39. Barry Meier, Cigarette Makers and States Draft a $206 Billion Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14,
1998, at A].
40. Even these limitations are now largely beyond the power of Congress or the states to
enact. See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 121 S. Ct. 2404 (2001 )(invalidating a number of state
and local restrictions on outdoor advertising of tobacco products on First Amendment and fed-
eral preemption grounds).
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scheduled reductions in teenage smoking were not met. No longer
was there any mention of acknowledging Food and Drug Administra-
tion (FDA) jurisdiction, a separate battleground that was then before
the Supreme Court, which subsequently ruled against the FDA-on
the agency's independent assertion of regulatory authority.4I No
longer was there certainty that the costs of smoking would rise appre-
ciably; estimates were that as a result of the settlement, the price of a
pack of cigarettes would rise a relatively modest 35 cents over five
years, and the agreement contained set-off provisions for federal tax
increases and product sales downturns that served as potential further
qualifiers.42 Indeed, no longer was there any assurance that the states
would spend a significant proportion of the industry payments on
smoking reduction programs. To the contrary, it soon became clear
that the states were earmarking the funds for a variety of projects un-
related to tobacco control, and, in many instances, bearing no rela-
tionship to public health concerns. 43  Many argued, with some
justification, that the major beneficiaries of the Master Settlement
Agreement were the plaintiffs' lawyers who stood to realize billions in
attorneys' fees. 44
Moreover, the third-party claims of insurers and union health funds,
modeled on the state reimbursement suits, have been singularly un-
successful with courts dismissing the claims on remoteness grounds.45
Similarly, a federal action seeking reimbursement for Medicare and
related federal health expenditures was dismissed, apart from a RICO
claim that is now in serious jeopardy under a seemingly unsympathetic
presidential administration. 46 In sum, the industry arguably has sealed
41. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Food & Drug Admin., 153 F.3d 155 (4th Cir. 1998),
affd Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
42. See Myron Levin et al., Accord Ends Key Phase in Ongoing Tobacco War, L.A. TIMES,
Nov. 17, 1998, at Al (stating that the settlement will be funded by a 35-cent-per-pack price
increase in cigarettes); Timothy E. Brooks, Tobacco Settlement: First Step or Misstep? Tobacco
Industry is the Winner, THE PLAIN DEALER, Dec. 11, 1998, at 17B (noting that payments to the
states will be reduced if federal taxes are increased or tobacco consumption diminishes).
43. See Michael Janofsky, Tiny Part of Settlement Money is Spent on Tobacco Control, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 11, 2001, at All; Greg Winter, State Officials are Faulted on Anti-Tobacco Pro-
grams, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2001, at A28.
44. See Henry Weinstein, Attack Waged on Fees Anti-Tobacco Attorneys Received Legal Ser-
vices: U.S. Chamber of Commerce calls the $11.3 billon paid outrageous. It might challenge law-
yers in court, L.A. TIMES, March 15, 2001, at Cl. But see infra note 84 and accompanying text
(discussing the impact of counter-advertising on the individual litigation).
45. See Scott Ritter, Unions' Claims on Tobacco Firms are Rejected by Appeals Court, WALL
ST. J., May 23, 2001, at B13. But see, Marc Kaufman, Ashcroft Signals Support of Tobacco Law-
suit, WASH. POST, Oct. 6, 2001, at A4 (asking heads of federal executive agencies to cooperate
puruant to the Justice Department proceeding in a lawsuit).
46. Marc Kaufman & Dan Eggen, U.S. to Seek Settlement in Tobacco Suit; Anti-Smoking Ac-
tivists Accuse Justice Dept. of Capitulation, WASH. POST, June 20, 2001, at Al. But see, Marc
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off any real concerns about catastrophic liability to third-party claim-
ants at a cost that is unlikely to have a substantial impact on its reve-
nue stream.
C. Environmental Tobacco Smoke Claims
Surprisingly, the earliest tobacco class action effort, commenced
near the end of 1991, was an action filed on behalf of nonsmoking
flight attendants alleging second-hand smoke injuries.47 The flight at-
tendants claimed to be suffering from tobacco-related diseases from
harm in the workplace-the airline cabins where they were regularly
exposed to tobacco-using passengers prior to the 1990 ban on in-flight
smoking.
Broin v. Philip Morris Cos., Inc.48 was brought in a Florida state
court by the same husband and wife team, the Rosenblatts, who would
later file the earlier-discussed Florida state court class action on behalf
of direct victims of smoking-related diseases.4 9 Broin was given very
little chance of succeeding when it was filed.50 This was before Cas-
tano, let alone any indication that the aggregation technique might
generally supplant case-by-case litigation. Moreover, secondhand
smoke harm had not yet attracted the general attention that it would
after the publication of the 1992 Environmental Protection Agency
report designating environmental tobacco smoke as a known human
lung carcinogen with no established safe level of exposure. 5'
Bold as it might seem, Broin had major points in its favor: First and
foremost, a sympathetic plaintiff class (flight attendants) that could
not be tarred with the assumed risk defense. Imagery also seemed
likely to work against the industry. Virtually everyone was familiar
with the smoke-filled ambience of the smoking section of an airplane
and could identify with the sustained, confined exposure of the flight
attendants. On the other hand, even after the publication of the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency (EPA) report, the epidemiological data
on workplace exposure remained very thin; the strongest association
between secondhand smoke and pulmonary disease was household
Kaufman, Ashcroft Signals Support of Tobacco Lawsuit, WASH. POST., Oct. 6, 2001, at A4 (ask-
ing heads of federal executive agencies to cooperate pursuant to the Justice Department pro-
ceeding in a lawsuit).
47. Broin v. Philip Morris Cos., No 91-49738 CA (22) (Fla. Cir. Ct.) (settlement Oct. 10, 1997).
48. Id.
49. See supra text accompanying note 19.
50. See Milo Geyelin, Flight Attendants Tobacco Trial Nears, WALL ST. J., June 2,1997, at B7.
51. U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, RESPIRATORY HEALTH EFFECTS OF PAS-
SIVE SMOKING: LUNG CANCER AND O-HER DISORDERS (1992).
[Vol. 51:331
A TENTATIVE ASSESSMENT
exposure, especially of young children, which obviously had no direct
bearing on the plaintiffs' case. 52
But before any of these issues on the merits of the case became
salient, there was the threshold question of nationwide class certifica-
tion. To the surprise of most observers, the trial court's refusal to cer-
tify was reversed by the Florida appellate court, and the Broin class
was certified for trial.53 The court of appeals, in a brief opinion, made
the matter seem clear-cut: generic causation and industry course of
conduct were questions common to the class, as was an assessment of
the egregiousness of defendants' conduct. 54 The court remarked that
any choice of law problems and individual issues of damages could be
decided at a later stage, perhaps by recourse to subclassing, notwith-
standing some 60,000 potential claims nationwide. 55
Whether Broin would have survived trial is open to serious ques-
tion. As the court of appeals opinion that approved the parties' subse-
quent settlement made clear, the defense had arguments of real
substance on the merits: no generic causation, no fraud as to second-
hand smoke claimants, and preclusion of suit by the statute of limita-
tions, among others. 56 But in the midst of trial, before these issues
could be addressed, a $349 million settlement was announced. 57 The
tobacco industry had once again demonstrated its vulnerability, just as
it did in the roughly contemporaneous settlements of the four state
health care reimbursement cases in Mississippi, Florida, Texas, and
Minnesota.
On closer inspection, the significance to be attached to the Broin
settlement is far less clear. Like the individual state agreements, it
came in the midst of the industry's effort to build a positive image in
support of the congressional debate over a global tobacco settlement.
It involved no compensation to the flight attendants themselves;
rather, it set up a scientific research foundation and made concessions
on the statute of limitations and the burden of proof in any individual
flight attendant cases that might be brought in the future. Perhaps
most important, it is highly problematic whether it has any wider ap-
plicability. In the individual workplace, secondhand smoke cases that
followed Broin-lung cancer claims brought by a barber for long-term
exposure in his shop and by of a nurse who worked for many years in
52. Id. at 7-10 to 7-21.
53. Broin, 641 So. 2d 888 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.1994).
54. Id. at 890.
55. Id. at 891.
56. Ramos v. Philip Morris Cos., 743 So. 2d 24 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
57. Settlement of Second-Hand-Smoke Suit of Flight Attendants Approved by Judge, WALL Si.
J., Feb. 9, 1998, at B7.
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a veterans' hospital-the industry made no concessions and prevailed
before juries. 58 And other occupational groups that might be consoli-
dated are not likely to replicate the widely shared exposure character-
istics of the flight attendants, who were themselves still highly
vulnerable to a no-causation defense. Thus, in the aftermath of Broin,
it seems dubious whether secondhand smoke litigation plows new
ground that will prove to be fertile.
D. Individual Claims Revitalized
The first chink in the industry's armor on the familiar battleground
of individual litigation came in a 1996 case, Carter v. Brown & Wil-
liamson.59 In Carter, a Florida trial lawyer, Woody Wilner, convinced
a state court jury that the industry's responsibility exceeded that of his
client; however, he did not argue that his client was without fault. 60 In
a similarly modest vein, Wilner did not make a claim for punitive
damages, despite introducing evidence of the tobacco company's ef-
forts to conceal health-related information. 61 The jury responded af-
firmatively, entering a verdict of $750,000 in compensatory damages
for the plaintiff's lung cancer. 62
Wilner's success and his stated resolve to bring an endless succes-
sion of similar cases against the industry, caught the attention of to-
bacco tort observers, many of whom had written the individual cases
off as historical anachronisms in light of the new wave of aggregation
claims. As the first rush of enthusiasm for consolidation gave way to
the grimmer prospect of long and uncertain struggles in the courts, the
simplicity of multiple presentations of Carter, reflecting the recast ver-
sion of the long-standing morality play of individual litigation, offered
new hope to tobacco activists.
Soon, however, reality set in. Within the span of two years, Wilner
won another case, Widdick v. Brown & Williamson,63 but he failed to
58. See Tobacco Industry Ruled Not Liable in Mississippi Case, WALL ST. J., June 3, 1999, at
A12. See also Terri Somers, Tobacco Lawsuits Still Viable: Secondhand Smoke Cases Will be
Pursued, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, April 8, 2001, at IB (detailing post-Broin litigation by individ-
ual flight attendants and explaining that, in the first such case to be decided, the plaintiff was
defeated).
59. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Carter, 680 So. 2d 546 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996),
rev'd, Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Carter, 723 So. 2d 833 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998),
rev granted, Carter v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 732 So.2d 326 (Fla. 1999), decision
quashed, 778 So.2d 932 (Fla. 2000), cert. denied, Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Carter,
121 S.Ct. 2593 (2001).
60. PRINOLE, supra note 3, at 264-65, 268.
61. Id. at 269-70.
62. Id. at 265.
63. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Widdick, 717 So. 2d 572 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
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convince juries that the industry should be held responsible for the
health effects of his clients' smoking in another pair of Florida cases.64
His scorecard was mixed, as were the signals sent by the handful of
jury verdicts in individual cases in the years immediately following
Carter. In fact, within the short span of three months, between March
and May 1999, juries awarded blockbuster verdicts of $50 million in
punitive damages in a California case, Henley v. Philip Morris, Inc.,65
and $85 million in an Oregon case, Williams-Branch v. Philip Morris,
Inc. 66 But a Tennessee jury rejected the claims of three tobacco liti-
gants, represented by Wilner, and a Kansas jury did likewise. By mid-
2000, another multimillion dollar California jury award had been reg-
istered, but so too had defense verdicts before juries in Mississippi and
New York; and all of the five pro-plaintiff outcomes remained on ap-
peal except for Carter, in which the plaintiff's award was finally up-
held. 67 The industry was clearly still contesting these lawsuits on all
fronts with vigor. Thunderbolts, nonetheless, continued to strike: Just
as it appeared that plaintiffs' awards might be tolerably few and far
between, a California jury handed down a three billion dollar punitive
damage award in mid-2001. 68
Putting aside the outcomes in individual cases, what, if any, were
the critical differences in the single-plaintiff tobacco tort suits being
brought in the 1990s from those brought earlier? In short, the distinc-
tion is in the documents. By the late 1990s, a tobacco litigator could
build a case against the industry on the voluminous document discov-
ery in the state health care cost recovery suits and the class action
litigation, as well as the earlier caches of whistleblower revelations. A
narrative could be woven beginning with tobacco officials discussing,
in clandestine fashion, the targeting of teenagers before they had de-
veloped to maturity and the retention of the adult market through the
addictive powers of nicotine. In Henley, for example, the plaintiff's
attorney put together a package of 790 damning industry documents,
and, although the trial judge allowed only ten to be introduced, this
64. Thomas C. Tobin, Ex-Smoker Savors Tobacco Win, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, July 16, 2001,
at lB.
65. No. 995172, 1999 WL 510276 (Cal. Super. 1999).
66. No. 9705-03957 (Or. Cir. Ct. 1999) Reduced by the trial judges to $25 million and $32.8
million respectively, but upheld otherwise. Id.
67. For discussion, see Robert L. Rabin, The Uncertain Future of Tobacco Tort Litigation in
the United States, 7 TORT L. REV. 91 (1999); for citation to the subsequent upholding of the
award in Carter, see Carter, 732 So. 2d 326.
68. See Gordon Fairclough, Philip Morris is Hit with $3 Billion Verdict, WALL ST. J., June 7,
2001, at A3. On rehearing, the trial court judge reduced the punitive damages award to $100
million; defendant has indicated it will appeal. Anna Gorman, Huge Award to Smoker Cut by
Judge Ruling, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2001, at B1.
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was sufficient to trigger a punitive damage award from the jury of $50
million, more than twice the punitives that the plaintiff had sought. 69
Moreover, the reinvention of the wheel, strategy-wise, was now a
thing of the past. Plaintiffs' attorneys drew not just on the same now-
public documents, but consulted among each other on micro-manage-
ment issues, such as which documents to rely on, what lines of argu-
ment to pursue, and what expert witnesses to call. By 1999, the
Tobacco Trial Lawyers Association, an organization dedicated to
networking and coordination among those involved in tobacco trial
litigation had been formed. By now, the term "trial in a box" has
come to characterize plaintiff attorney preparation in the current
wave of individual cases. 70
But as the returns to date indicate, if massive liability awards now
seem a possibility as never in the past, the industry still remains armed
with effective weapons. Relying on the strongly individualistic strand
in American culture, freedom of choice can still be mustered as a pow-
erful defense. This is especially true as the industry shifts ground and
confesses to its past machinations-arguing, instead, that it has now
reformed its ways under new "enlightened leadership."' 71 If the docu-
ments eventually come to be viewed as a matter of only historical in-
terest, and if the industry concedes that addiction means it is very hard
but nonetheless possible to quit-and this plaintiff, unlike so many
other ex-smokers knowledgeable of the health risks, did not demon-
strate the requisite will power-it may be that a freedom of choice
defense will be newly energized. 72
Another shift, away from a defense that eventually became an em-
barrassment, has now taken place. From the outset of the litigation,
the industry argued that the causal link between smoking and alleg-
edly tobacco-related diseases had never been conclusively established:
Correlation is not causation. This argument, too, finally became an
albatross, not just because of the voluminous epidemiological findings,
but also because of the hypocrisy revealed in the documents. But the
69. Henley v. Philip Moris, 1999 WL 221076 (Cal. Super. 1999) (explaining that plaintiffs had
request $15 million in punitive damages but the jury had returned an award of $50 million).
70. See Gordon Fairclough, California May be Hazardous to Big Tobacco's Health, WALL Sr.
J., June 8, 2001, at B1.
71. Rick Bragg, Tobacco Industry has Changed Its Ways, Executive Says, N.Y. TIMES, June 13,
2000, at A24. But the confessions of past sins are certainly no sure bet before an otherwise-
incensed jury, as the $3 billion award in Boeken v. Philip Morris indicates. See Fairclough, supra
note 70.
72. But there is a possible interplay here between the fruits of the Master Settlement Agree-
ment - the state health care cost reimbursement provisions - and the individual cases. To the
extent that MSA funds are allocated to counter-advertising, they may keep the public's attention
focused on a message that this is a death-dealing industry.
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concession of generic causation does not close the door on arguing
that the particular plaintiff has a type of lung cancer not associated
strongly with smoking, died from an independent disease, or died
from lung cancer but was massively exposed to asbestos, and so forth.
Because of the long latency of tobacco-related disease, the plaintiff's
life history often creates the possibility of multiple causes of life-
threatening illness.
These latter considerations bring us back full circle to the matter of
cost. It remains the case, as in the first two waves of litigation, that
expert witnesses are central to trying a tobacco tort case. The docu-
ments do not change this critical feature of the cases. The etiology of
tobacco-related disease frequently requires the testimony of a
pathologist, a pharmacologist, an oncologist, an epidemiologist, an ad-
diction specialist, and public health experts. Aside from the health
perspective, there is frequently the need for experts in marketing, pro-
motion, and product design aspects of the case. As long as the plain-
tiff's risk-taking proclivities remain an element of the defense
strategy, a laundry list of character witnesses from the plaintiff's past
with corresponding pretrial deposition and interrogatory costs is likely
to be a staple of the cases. In short, the documents, as a somewhat
standardized package, go part of the way towards reducing the costs
of tobacco tort litigation. But only part of the way. The cases are
likely to remain expensive and time-consuming propositions as long as
they are vigorously contested by the industry, and there is no reason
to think that the defense needs to win every case in order to maintain
an affordable product.
III. A PUBLIC HEALTH PERSPECTIVE ON THE
TOBACCO LITIGATION
Studies indicate that about 430,000 premature deaths occur annu-
ally in the United States as a result of tobacco use.7 3 This is an enor-
mous figure that accounts for the major attention paid to the problem
in the public health community. But what is the "appropriate" level of
mortality and serious disease from smoking? None at all? The num-
bers that would nonetheless occur if smokers were fully informed of
the health risks of smoking? And in assessing the case for regulatory
intervention, how does addiction fit into the picture? Or the fact that
most smokers take up the habit at an immature age?
These bedrock philosophical questions about how much smoking a
society should tolerate take us far beyond the scope of this com-
73. See NAT'L CENTER, supra note 5.
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ment.74 Nonetheless, it is possible to discuss the contribution that to-
bacco litigation has made to the control of smoking along a number of
dimensions. In traditional tort terms, the litigation can be evaluated
from a deterrence perspective. From a broader public health vantage
point, the litigation can be viewed as one among many strategies cur-
rently employed to reduce smoking, and the question can be asked
whether litigation has had a positive interactive effect with these other
approaches. Finally, the tobacco litigation can be evaluated in terms
of its secondary consequences as a medium for educating the public.
In the following discussion, I will consider each of these perspectives.
A. Litigation as a Regulatory Regime: Deterrence
For a generation, a principal theme in tort theory has been the artic-
ulation of the deterrent role of tort 75 This theme has been particu-
larly evident in the modern development of liability in tort for product
injuries-a domain that includes smoking-related harm. Deterrence
theory has provided the underlying foundation for claims of inade-
quate warning and defectively dangerous design. In the former in-
stance, the argument from a tort perspective has been that imposing
liability on tobacco manufacturers would create incentives to warn the
public more adequately about the health and addiction risks of smok-
ing. In the latter case, the claim is that liability would create incen-
tives to take all reasonable steps to manufacture a safer cigarette.76
Tobacco manufacturers, in turn, argue that smokers are the better-cost
avoiders because they are fully aware of the risks of smoking and can
decide whether those risks are outweighed by the satisfaction derived
from smoking. A market system such as ours, the argument goes,
does not seek to eliminate accidental harm-we do, after all, build
high-speed roads and allow risky activities such as skiing. Rather, the
system seeks to optimize harm by allocating injury costs to the party
best able to take cost-efficient measures for reducing injury.
This is the theory. In the real world of tobacco litigation, however,
deterrence considerations operate so haphazardly as to lose virtually
all meaning. The major costs imposed on the tobacco industry
through nearly a half-century of litigation have been the $206 billion
74, For discussion of these issues, see JACOB SULLUM, FOR YOUR OWN GOOD: THE ANTI-
SMOKING CRUSADE AND THE TYRANNY OF PUBLIC HEALTH (1998); ROBERT GOODIN, No
SMOKING: THE ETHICAL ISSUES (1989).
75. See GUIOo CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS (1970); WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICH-
ARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW (1987).
76. See Jon Hanson & Kyle Logue, The Costs of Cigarettes: The Economic Case for Ex Post
Incentive-based Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 1163 (1998).
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settlement with the states, the associated billions in earlier settlements
with four individual states, and the untold millions paid to the industry
lawyers to contest liability on all fronts-estimated in mid-2000 to be
in the neighborhood of $900 million annually. 77 The cost of the state
settlements bears no rational relationship to any intelligible notion of
appropriate deterrence. It represents nothing more than the political
outcome of what the traffic would bear after four years of jousting
with the states over public health care costs (supplemented later in the
litigation by a variety of unfair business practice claims). Similarly,
the massive litigation costs of a half-century of tort warfare do not
conform to a fine-tuned theoretical objective of internalizing accident
costs.
This is not to say that the massive financial expenditures imposed
on the industry to buy a measure of peace have had no regulatory
effect on smoking. To the extent that these costs are internalized in
the price of tobacco products sold in the future, they are reflected in
price increases and affect demand for tobacco. Reportedly, sharp
price increases, beginning after the multi-state settlement in late 1998,
resulted in a drop in domestic cigarette consumption of about seven
percent in 1999.78 Rather, the point is that the costs bear no particular
relationship to the goal of imposing a burden on the industry that re-
flects its proper responsibility for the disease-related harm associated
with smoking.
Nothing about the mixed record of litigation success against the in-
dustry since the mid-1990s changes this conclusion. To the extent that
these victories stand on appeal, they will sharply underscore the mas-
sive uncertainty and potential for catastrophic loss arising from puni-
tive damage awards. But these punitive damage awards, in turn,
reflect no more than isolated resolutions of the morality play of victim
versus industry in which a particular jury decides to "send a message"
to the industry. Again, a string of these awards will affect price and
consequent demand. Indeed a groundswell of individual awards or
even a single multibillion-dollar aggregate award might threaten the
financial viability of the industry. However, this affords no clear sig-
nal whether from a public health or economic efficiency perspective,
tobacco litigation is having the desired impact on smoking.79 And
77. Milo Geyelin & Gordon Fairclough, Taking a Hit: Yes, $145 Billion Deals a Huge Blow,
But Not a Killing One, WALL ST. J. July 17, 2000, at Al.
78. Id.
79. In fact, insolvency itself would arguably have only a minimal impact on the availability of
tobacco-albeit perhaps under a rather different regime of promotion and distribution after cor-
porate reorganization in bankruptcy.
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suppose that the litigation essentially dried up through a conceivable
combination of reversals on appeal and unsympathetic juries. Would
the urgency of the public health concern be any less?
In any event, it seems apparent that tort liability is an exceedingly
blunt weapon for doing battle with tobacco on the consumer demand
front. Clearly, the industry can no longer stand behind its long-time
boast that not a penny has been paid out in tort liability, not after the
state settlements and the still-uncertain bill of continuing individual
litigation.80 But the boast was always illusory in a sense. From the
outset, the industry spared no litigation expense in battling tort liabil-
ity. The costs of litigation always had some impact on the price of
tobacco; now the impact is far larger, and, in the future, it could be
exorbitant. At no time, however, have litigation-associated costs op-
erated as a rational scheme from a regulatory perspective in affecting
the demand for the product. Put another way, tort is a haphazard
public health strategy because it is powerfully influenced in the to-
bacco arena by ever-changing ethical judgments about the scruples of
the contestants and extraordinary investments of lawyering activity in
attempting to stage an effective appeal to moral sensibilities. It is not
a forward-looking strategic device that aims to fine-tune behavior
through the medium of liability awards.
B. Litigation and Complementary Control Strategies
In the years immediately preceding the mid-1990s, state and local
governments enacted a wide range of regulatory controls over to-
bacco: Many localities across the nation adopted restrictions on smok-
ing in public places; states and localities enacted a wide variety of
controls on retail sales and possession of cigarettes by minors; some
states adopted significant excise tax increases on tobacco; many com-
munities restricted advertising of tobacco products; some states en-
gaged in counter-advertising campaigns; and at the federal level,
modest measures in some of these areas were enacted. 81
For present purposes, the question is how tobacco litigation inter-
sects with this broad array of regulatory strategies. In one sense, the
public health aims and accomplishments of these initiatives highlight
the limitations of litigation as a regulatory strategy. Because recent
data indicate, at most, a leveling in smoking among teenagers,8 2 and it
is well-established that smoking initiation is largely a youth phenome-
80. See supra notes 59-68 and accompanying text.
81. For comprehensive discussion of these strategies, see ROBERT L. RABIN & STEPHEN D.
SUGARMAN, REGULATING TOBACCO (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 2001).
82. See NAT'L CENTER supra note 6.
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non,83 a powerful case can be made that reducing underage smoking is
the most salient of tobacco control goals. There is little reason to
think that tort litigation contributes much in a direct sense to achiev-
ing this objective. Tort awards translate into money judgments to
smoking victims rather than compelling retailers to check the age of
cigarette purchasers, dictating the character of tobacco advertising, or
proscribing the possession of cigarettes.
At the same time, however, it is possible to argue that tort has had
an indirect sanctioning effect. To the extent that the tobacco industry
expends large sums on litigation defense and liability awards, these
costs of doing business lead to increases in the price of cigarettes,
which would have a positive impact on reducing minors' smoking.
Similarly, as mentioned, the settlements with the states did provide for
limited controls on advertising and promotion, as well as generating
revenues that will in some instances be used to fund counter-advertis-
ing.84 In the larger scheme of things, however, it is difficult to make
the case for any major inroad in teenage smoking as a result of tort
liability. Barring a series of catastrophic judgments against the indus-
try that would create a dramatic upward spiral in the price of tobacco,
youth smoking is likely to diminish only when a fine-tuned approach is
developed for integrating some combination of stricter retail enforce-
ment, tax increases, and educational initiatives that make smoking ap-
pear less "cool."
With respect to adult smokers, arguably the most effective long-
term public health measures are the increasingly stringent controls on
smoking in the workplace and in places of public accommodation.
These controls are likely to lessen the potential impact of second-hand
smoke harm, particularly on heavily exposed coworkers and service
providers. At the same time, these restrictions may change the habit-
ual behavior of smokers themselves over time: As smoking becomes
increasingly time and place-proscribed, the tobacco habit may become
more attenuated for any but the most hardcore smokers. In this
sphere of conduct control, tobacco litigation, in contrast to legislative
activity, has no immediately apparent complementary role to play,
putting aside the indirect and somewhat haphazard effect of cata-
83. In the United States, almost 90% of smokers have their first cigarette before the age of 18.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, PREVENTING TOBACCO USE AMONG
YOUNG PEOPLE: A REPORT TO THE SURGEON GENERAL (1994).
84. A major caveat, however. In addition to the diversion of settlement funds to non-tobacco
uses mentioned, supra note 43 and accompanying text, it appears that the tobacco industry has
had considerable success in circumventing the restrictions on magazine advertising aimed at
youths. See Alex Kuczynski, Tobacco Companies Accused of Still Aiming Ads at Youths. N.Y.
TIMES., Aug. 15, 2001, at Al.
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strophic tort awards that might dramatically increase the cost of to-
bacco or force the industry into bankruptcy.
C. Educational Effects
In recent years, public opinion polls have consistently indicated that
the public, including the smoking public, is well aware of the health
risks of smoking. 85 Indeed, the industry has used this information to
its own end in the tort litigation as a buttress to its argument that
smokers assume the risk of smoking-related diseases. In my view,
however, tobacco tort proponents cannot lay claim to a significant role
in creating a risk-informed public. As far back as 1954, when Reader's
Digest triggered the first smoking-related cancer scare through
graphic summation of the initial scientific studies of the relationship
between lung cancer and smoking, the media has played a key role in
publishing health findings on tobacco.86 In addition, beginning with
the U.S Surgeon General's Report of 1964, the federal government
has played an important complementary role.8 7 In fact, it is important
to recognize that prior to the filing of Castano and the health care
reimbursement suits, tobacco tort litigation was a distinctly low-visibil-
ity enterprise, and by the time those cases were filed, the health risks
of tobacco were already common knowledge.18
In contrast, the addictive properties of nicotine had received less
attention through the early 1990s; as discussed above, recent litigation
has capitalized on this perceived information gap. But here, too, the
educational role of tort is hard to assess. The whistleblower-leaked
documents that provided support for Castano and the state heath care
reimbursement suits were simultaneously distributed to leading news
media, Congressional representatives, the FDA, and public health ac-
tivists. 89 In particular, the joint appearance of tobacco executives
before the Waxman committee, in which they avowed ignorance of
85. See Hanson & Logue, supra note 76, at 1183-86.
86. See Robert L. Rabin, Institutional and Historical Perspectives on Tobacco Tort Liability, in
SMOKING POLICY: LAW, POLITICS, AND CULTURE 111-12 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D.
Sugarman eds., 1993) (attributing the first wave of tobacco litigation in part to a series of
Reader's Digest articles linking smoking to lung cancer).
87. The Surgeon General publishes an annual report on a selected dimension of the public
health concerns related to smoking. And beginning in 1965, Congress mandated health warnings
on cigarette packages and advertisements. Many of the Reports, as well as the evolving cigarette
warning legislation, are discussed in a historical context in RICHARD KLUGER, ASHES TO ASHES:
AMERICA'S HUNDRED-YEAR CIGARETTE WAR, THE PUBLIC HEALTH, AND THE UNABASHED
TRIUMPH OF PHILIP MORRIS (1996).
88. Philip J. Cook, The Matter of Tobacco Use, SCIENCE, Dec. 10, 1993, at 1750 (reviewing
SMOKING POLICY: LAW, POLITICS, AND CULTURE, supra note 86.
89. See PRINGLE, supra note 3, at 54, 73-76.
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the effects of nicotine, focused nationwide attention on nicotine addic-
tion as did the TV documentary, Day One.90 Thus, it seems fair to say
that by the mid-1990s, the channels of public communication of health
information concerning the risks of tobacco were overflowing, making
it impossible to identify a singularly influential source.
Nonetheless, a meaningful distinction can be drawn between the
key sources of public information about the health risks of tobacco,
and, beginning in 1993, the most salient source of information on the
unfolding narrative concerning the industry's pattern of concealing
and misrepresenting its own understanding of those health risks over a
period of some thirty years. On this latter score, the determined ef-
forts at pretrial discovery in litigation, such as that pursued by the
state of Minnesota in its health care reimbursement suit, did in fact
stand out as a source of public information.91 As in the earlier case of
asbestos, the full story of conscious industry disregard for the health
effects of its profit-making activity might never have become a part of
the public record in the absence of the tort litigation.92
If this is correct, tort law in the tobacco context is most assuredly
public law, not so much because of its social welfare character as a
compensatory mechanism, nor for its regulatory character as a me-
dium for establishing proper incentives for safety, but for its contribu-
tion to the unfolding documentation of public affairs.
IV. BEYOND TOBACCO: CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
The tobacco litigation has richly rewarded a relative handful of
plaintiffs' attorneys, and in doing so, has arguably given them the
wherewithal to engage in other mass tort litigation ventures that fit
their description of lawyering in the public interest. 93 Whether these
lawyers have consequently targeted industries, such as gun makers
and lead paint manufacturers, that they would otherwise have ignored
is another question. At the threshold, one can observe that most of
these high-visibility plaintiffs' lawyers have done very well for them-
90. See PRINGLE, supra note 3, at 68-9, for discussion of the effect of tobacco executives'
appearance before the Waxman committee, Day One Smoke Screen Segment (ABC television
broadcast, Feb. 28, 1994).
91. For detailed treatment of the Minnesota strategy, see Michael Ciresi et al., Decades of
Deceit: Document Discovery in the Minnesota Tobacco Litigation, 25 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 477
(1999).
92. On asbestos, see PAUL BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS MISCONDUCT: THE ASBESTOS INDUSTRY
ON TRIAL (1985); for a more detailed treatment of the educational effects of tort litigation, see
Robert L. Rabin, Reassessing Regulatory Compliance, 88 GEO. L.J. 2049, 2068-70 (2000).
93. Tobacco Lawyer's Roundtable: A Report From the Front Lines, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 541
(2002).
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selves in other mass tort litigation, ranging from asbestos to breast
implants and diet drugs. 94 For the past two decades, there has been no
shortage of lucrative plaintiffs' work available for those with the req-
uisite expertise in high stakes tort litigation.
Without doubt, the tobacco litigation provided these attorneys with
a singular experience in coordinating efforts in document discovery,
mapping legal strategies, and negotiating with a particularly intransi-
gent industry. Again, however, entirely apart from tobacco, high pro-
file plaintiffs' attorneys now exchange information through well-
developed channels, be it section meetings on special litigation topics
or internet communication on individual cases.95 It is one thing to
observe that tobacco created an occasion for honing their skills by
developing and implementing their expertise in a particularly complex
venture; it is quite another to conclude that tobacco created a recep-
tivity or capacity for taking on an industry perceived to be litigation-
vulnerable that would not have been exercised in any event when
other opportunities arose.
Perhaps, however, the tobacco litigation created a singular game
plan for attacking a perceived renegade industry that could readily be
adapted to successive efforts elsewhere. This might be true if the to-
bacco litigation involved novel doctrinal strategies or litigation tech-
niques that were immediately transferable.
Initially consider doctrinal matters. The individual tort litigation
clearly rested on conventional doctrinal considerations: The salient is-
sues, nearly from the outset, have been whether smokers assume the
risk, or in any event, apart from actual knowledge of risk, have relied
on industry misrepresentations. 96 More recently, in framing a theory
of recovery, the central question has been whether the documents
make out a case of fraud or misrepresentation by the industry.97
There has never been a departure from this conventional tort frame-
work, aside from a constitutional detour into the preemption thicket a
decade ago,98 or serious doubt that these issues raised jury questions
94. See, e.g, the profiles of top-earning plaintiffs' lawyers in Michael Freedman, Judgment
Day, FORBES, May 14, 2001, at 132-34.
95. See Howard M. Erichson, Informal Aggregation: Procedural and Ethical Implications of
Coordination Among Counsel in Related Lawsuits, 50 DUKE LJ. 381, 388-401 (2000) (discussing
informal methods of coordination among plaintiffs' attorneys).
96. See Rabin, supra note 86, at 122-25.
97. In an earlier phase, the key liability issue was whether the tobacco companies negligently
failed to warn. See id. at 114-18.
98. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992) (interpreting the federal ciga-
rette labeling act to preempt state tort claims based on a theory of failure to provide an adequate
warning),
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rather than developing new law. In fact, the individual-plaintiff cases
have been decided case-by-case on the basis of of how particular juries
resolve what I have elsewhere referred to as this "morality play." 99
So, it is difficult to discern any advances or innovations in tort doc-
trine growing out of the nearly half century of tort claims lodged by
individual claimants against the industry.
Similarly, the class action tort litigation has foundered, as discussed
above, on relatively straightforward considerations of applying rule
23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to a class consisting
of anywhere between hundreds of thousands and millions of alleged
tobacco victims, depending on whether the aggregation is statewide or
nationwide. 100 It is hard to glean novel procedural principles from
these cases, and certainly they have not laid a foundation for expan-
sive use by the plaintiffs' bar, because the cases have been nearly uni-
formly dismissed.
But what of the governmental entity cases? Here the doctrinal in-
novation has been in bringing health care cost reimbursement claims
on behalf of the states based on a variety of theories; perhaps most
prominently, as mentioned above, common law claims of unjust en-
richment and statutory claims based on various state consumer protec-
tion schemes. 1'0 Has there been spillover to other areas? By contrast,
the municipal litigation against handgun manufacturers has been
based on sharply different considerations. At the most fundamental
level, the claims are not principally for cost recovery. The cost recov-
ery component in the handgun cases has rested on attenuated specula-
tion about heightened emergency room expenditures and additional
police personnel needs that can be appropriately allocated to industry
practices in failing to safeguard against criminal use of handguns.'0 2
These costs are virtually a throw-in when compared to the state and
municipal claims for medical expenditures devoted to treatment of
lung cancer and other smoking-related diseases in the tobacco cases.
More fundamentally, the municipal handgun cases have been di-
rected at changing the distributional and design practices of the hand-
gun manufacturers, not at cost recovery. As such, the handgun cases
have been based principally on theories of negligent marketing and
99. See Rabin, supra note 86, at 122; see also Richard L. Cupp, A Morality Play's Third Act:
Revisiting Addiction, Fraud, and Consumer Choice in "Third Wave" Tobacco Litigation, 46 U.
KANS. L. REV. 465 (1998).
100. See supra notes 11-18 and accompanying text.
101. See supra note 27-31 and accompanying text.
102. Carolyn Barta Cities Look to Courts in Fight Against Gun-Related Crimes. DALLAS
MORNINO NEWS, June 6, 1999, at 1A.
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public nuisance. 10 3 At this point, there is serious doubt about the via-
bility of these claims.' 0 4 But whether or not handgun litigation ulti-
mately proves successful, it relies on doctrinal claims that cannot trace
a lineage to the governmental tobacco litigation. The theories have no
carryover.
Moreover, in both the handgun and lead paint arenas, there are se-
rious causation issues that once again sharply separate these ventures
from tobacco. Indeed, when causal issues have been salient in the to-
bacco cases, they have operated as a barrier to recovery, in particular,
the no-proximate-cause dismissals of third-party health insurer and
pension fund claims,' 0 5 rather than developing a technique that might
play a positive role for litigation-minded social reformers. In fact, in
the handgun area, the proximate cause inquiries are still more vexing,
because the injured party is further removed from the industry than in
tobacco: Consider the chain of responsibility from manufacturer to
municipality running through distributors, retailers, and gunshot
victims.
From a causal perspective, lead paint litigation seems to have even
less to do with tobacco. Here, the main issue is cause-in-fact rather
than proximate cause. The main issue is identifying the manufacturers
whose products are in fact responsible for risks from peeling and flak-
ing lead paint chips, often in houses and apartments of rather ancient
vintage, characterized by multiple layers of paint and no correspond-
ing documentation of paint suppliers. 10 6 No comparable issues of
product identification are encountered in the tobacco arena, where
market share liability of tobacco products posing identical health risks
alleviates any causal identification problems. 107
103. For discussion of the nuisance theory, see David Kairys, The Governmental Handgun
Cases and the Elements of Public Nuisance, 32 CONN. L .REv. 1175 (2000). For discussion of the
negligent marketing theories, see Judge Jack Weinstein's opinion in Hamilton v. Accu-tec, 62 F.
Supp. 2d 802 (E.D.N.Y.1999).
104. For a recent discussion of municipal handgun litigation, see John G. Culhane & Jean M.
Eggen, Defining a Proper Role for Public Nuisance Law in Municipal Suits Against Gun Sellers:
Beyond Rhetoric and Expedience, 52 S.C. L. REV. 287 (2001). The principal private tort suits
based on negligent marketing and distribution theories have been dismissed, see Merrill v. Nave-
gar, 28 P.3d 116 (CA 2001); Hamilton v. Beretta USA Corp. 750 N.E.2d 1055 (N.Y. 2001); but
see Smith v. Bryco Arms, N.M. App. (2001), Docket No. 20,389, an intermediate court of ap-
peals case reinstating a design defect products liability claim (based on inadequate safety fea-
tures) in a case involving a gun shot wound suffered by a teenager when his friend injured him
with a gun they thought was unloaded.
105. See supra text accompanying note 45.
106. For a highly critical view of the lead paint litigation venture, see Michael Freedman,
Turning Lead into Gold, FORBES, May 14, 2001, at 122-26.
107. The health risks from the various brands of cigarettes would be regarded as "fungible"
within the meaning of Sinchell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980), cert denied 449 U.S. 912
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In these post-tobacco ventures, as well as others that might be dis-
cussed, 108 if there is a lineage worth noting at all, it is perhaps, as crit-
ics have pointed out, the sheer force (and fear) of high stakes
litigation coercing an industry to the bargaining table where compen-
sation and some forms of remedial action can be extracted. 0 9 If, in
the final analysis, this is the legacy of the tobacco litigation, it is surely
an ironic state of affairs. For four decades, Big Tobacco used its enor-
mous resources to beat down every effort by litigants to secure com-
pensation, usually by imposing such heavy litigation costs that the
cases were dismissed far short of the courthouse door. Should one cry
"foul" and invoke separation of powers rhetoric when the tables are
turned? Are frivolous litigation ventures, as measured against the
current framework of tort principles, beyond the competence of the
judiciary to weed out at a tolerable cost to society? These are weighty
questions, but the tobacco litigation itself, in my view, does not supply
an affirmative answer.
(1980) (applying market share liability to the manufacturers of DES, after finding that essen-
tially the same risk was associated with each manufacturer's version of the drug). In tobacco
cases, there are sometimes causal issues of another sort; namely, whether the type of lung cancer
suffered by the plaintiff is associated with smoking. But this issue has no analogue in the other
class action litigation discussed here.
108. See e.g., Bob Van Voris, Ritalin Class Actions: Fast Start, Big Stumble, NAT'L. L.J., Aug. 6,
2001, at Al (class action litigation against manufacturer of drug aimed at alleviating attention
deficit disorders and hypertension in youths); Randall Smith and Jerry Markon, Note to Suers of
Analysts: Rough Road Ahead, WALL ST. J., Aug. 3, 2001, at C1 (involving class action securities
fraud litigation); Hanoch Dagan and James White, Governments, Citizens, and Injurious Indus-
tries, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354, 355 (2000) (suggesting that brewers, distillers, and producers of
fatty foods may be next in line for suit).
109. See Dagan & White, supra note 108 (taking the tobacco litigation as a model for the
recent pattern of litigation and settlement).
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